(Lennox's paper on "Material and Formal Natures in Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium" is also reproduced in his own collection.) Kullmann's contribution, "Die Voraussetzungen für das Studium der Biologie bei Aristoteles," though much more ambitious in its overall intent, does also deal with the role of matter in this context. I shall refer to it again later; here I just want to acknowledge the existence in the texts before us of numerous illuminating analyses which I must perforce neglect in turning to what seem to me large issues that our authors leave open for debate.
It should come as no surprise, that, like most historical undertakings, at least any with philosophical underpinnings or implications, our texts raise issues of interpretation that are still subject to controversy. Two very general, and at the same time fundamental, questions need to be considered. First, how does Aristotle's methodological program, especially as presented in the Posterior Analytics, relate to the practice reported in the biological works? And second, how is Aristotle's science related to the theory and practice of his modern successors? There are also some less global issues glanced at in these texts, which may or may not be related to the larger issues. I will turn to those brieºy in conclusion.
First, then, how rigorously does Aristotle the biologist follow the dictates of Aristotle the methodologist? It is Lennox's major thesis that the latter follows the former very closely indeed. It is Lloyd's major thesis that he does not. For Lennox, the discoverer of the tools of philosophy takes care to apply those tools properly and consistently as he executes and expresses the outcome of his scientiªc work. There is only one Aristotle, the supreme methodologist who applies that methodology consistently in his study of the natural world. For Lloyd, a more tentative and experimental Aristotle shows above all a remarkable "sense of the interdependence of philosophical analysis and empirical investigation" (p. 137). Yet, he insists, although the two interests work together, we should be careful to distinguish between "Aristotle the logician" and "Aristotle the ªeld-worker" (p. 73). There are at least two Aristotles, maybe a host of them, and that is just why the range of work done under the name of this one, yet manifold, thinker is so fascinating. Plato talked about the one over many. In this case, which is it: the one controlling the many, or the many enriching the apparent one?
As a relative outsider to this dispute, who has worked only brieºy and long ago (with the most welcome and generous help of David Balme) on a particular technical aspect of Aristotle's philosophy of biology-as a relative outsider, I confess to having an answer, at least a partly evasive answer, to that question. But ªrst let me try to summarize the two points of view as fairly as I can.
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Aristotelian Biology Although Lennox's essays cover a period of twenty years, they are all, he tells us in the introduction to the volume, addressed in some way to what he calls "an exciting possibility," namely, "that [Aristotle's] zoology reºects the recommendations of his philosophy of zoology, and that his philosophy of zoology reºects his general philosophy of science" (p. xxii). There are, he confesses, problems in the way of actualizing that possibility. For example, there is the absence of any discussion of form and matter in the methodological treatises-concepts fundamental to the work in natural history. Nor is there any cross-reference from the philosophical essays introductory to the biology, that is, the ªrst book of the Parts of Animals, to the more general methodological works. Further, division is treated differently in those two texts. There are also apparent discrepancies between the programmatic statements of PA I and the detailed biological works themselves. However, Lennox concludes, "[e]ach of the chapters in this volume contributes to the task of overcoming these various problems, and thus to presenting a uniªed version of Aristotle's philosophy of biology as carrying out, in a speciªc domain of natural science, the philosophical program of the Posterior Analytics. This involves considerable enrichment of that program, but not an abandonment of it" (p. xxiii). It would be unkind to say that Lennox is obsessed with this task; it is certainly a major intellectual preoccupation, one could even call it his vocation. Kullmann, in his Bad Homburg paper, in effect agrees with this position, since he holds that Aristotle's biological work supplements the more mathematically oriented exposition of the Organon by adding the necessary reference to matter. Along with the stress on ªnal cause, that would, I presume, be the kind of "enrichment" of the program that Lennox has in mind.
It is the essays of Part One of Lennox's collection, "Inquiry and Explanation," that deal most explicitly with the author's major thesis. The ªrst, "Divide and Explain," relies in particular on Aristotle's advice to the scientist in Posterior Analytics II, 14: he is to . . . select thus, positing the kind common to all, e.g., if the subjects of study are animals, [select] what follows all animals, and having grasped these, again what follows all the ªrst remaining things, e.g., if this is bird, what follows every bird, and thus always [ask what belongs] to the nearest kind (98a 2-8; pp. 13-14).
Without our going into the particulars of Lennox's careful analysis here, it should be clear that Aristotle is recommending that the practitioner of natural history should start with a rather general common kind, and carefully focus in on a more restricted kind, in which he can ªnd differentiae that follow from the very nature of that kind. That will be proper Aristo-telian explanation. As I mentioned earlier, Lennox illustrates this endeavor through looking at the overall aims of the History of Animals, and also at a number of passages in the Parts of Animals. He has discovered, he tells us in conclusion, "[a] number of lines of evidence suggesting deep afªnities between the theory of explanation and understanding in the Apo and the zoological treatises" (p. 32).
The History of Animals is again the focus of the second essay, "Data and Demonstration," in which that treatise is shown to be narrowing in on the differentiae of appropriate units. The later biological treatises will then proceed to demonstrate their causes. This is, Lennox argues, "the ªrst step toward causal accounts in the explanatory model proposed in the Posterior Analytics" (p. 65). The third essay examines the nature of problems in Aristotle, a technical concept that had been touched on in the ªrst chapter. Finally, the fourth chapter "Putting Philosophy of Science to the Test: The Case of Aristotelian Biology," is intended to show deªnitively how Aristotle's philosophy of science is applied, with due speciªcation and elaboration, ªrst, in Book One of the Parts of Animals, which is in effect a philosophical introduction to the biological works, and then, through the detailed analysis of an example, in the scientiªc books that follow. The analysis of Book One involves back references to passages in the Analytics, Prior as well as Posterior, while granting that the concept of conditional necessity, absent from the general methodological treatises, has had to be added to deal with the subject matter of the life sciences. The example chosen to illustrate Aristotle's scientiªc practice is that of the fat surrounding the kidneys. Lennox uses this case to show how causes are exhibited through syllogistic explanation, and how in particular, for living things, the ªnal cause takes primacy-though never, of course, eliminating the concomitant references to matter. If there appears to be a question how a methodological treatise based primarily on mathematical examples can be applied to living things, demanding as these do explanations grounded in teleology, PA I, Lennox concludes, answers this question, and, further, that answer is borne out in detail in Aristotle's actual biological practice. The overall lesson is that it is Aristotle the logician who guides Aristotle the zoologist.
For Lloyd, as we noted, the contrary is the case. Indeed, Lloyd is not even sure of a single, well-deªned character for the theorist of scientiªc method, who is supposed to have told us what a demonstration is and how to produce one. In an essay "On the theories and practices of demonstration," he exhibits, through careful citation, the range of senses of "demonstration" in Aristotle's works, works as diverse as the Rhetoric, the Ethics, the Metaphysics. It is not so clear, according to him, that there is just one univocal kind of demonstration to serve as model for the natural scientist, certainly not the model set up at the start of the Posterior Analytics, in which primary, indemonstrable premises must stand at the head of scientiªc explanation. The biological works themselves provide some of his examples, and PA I, in particular, Lloyd concludes, far from following the rules set up in Apo, "uses end-products as its starting-points and works back to their conditionally necessary starting-points" (pp. 36-7).
At ªrst sight it looks as if Lloyd is keen on following the opening chapters of the methodological text, while Lennox (who reproaches his colleagues for neglecting the later chapters) concentrates on Book II, 14-18. But there is more to it than that: in the essays that follow the opening critique of "demonstration," Lloyd repeatedly stresses, not the rigor of Aristotle's method, but his openness: his willingness, as a ªeld biologist, to hesitate, to qualify his own doctrines, to see problems in applying principles too sweepingly, or too univocally. For example, in an essay on "Fuzzy Natures," in which he considers some cases where Aristotle has trouble determining, by his usual criterion of perception, whether he is dealing with a plant or an animal, Lloyd concludes:
. . . the situation may be the following: it is only when Aristotle confronts some of the really difªcult cases directly that he has grounds for hesitation and (on this suggestion) may be led to modify his usual view. Generally speaking, and for most purposes, the perception criterion will do and can be spoken of as the key determining characteristic. After all the deªnite exceptions to that rule amount just to the jellyªsh and holothouria, even though, as he also notes, other animals give no indication, or only a faint one, of perception, and in some cases one can grasp no other function besides generation. Yet when faced with those problematic creatures in the sea, Aristotle-on this suggestion-is prepared to revise his idea of what an animal is.
The lesson is that . . . for those who give full weight to the signs of hesitation where he has good reason to hesitate-for as we said it is no easy matter determining the borderline-this is testimony to the ºexibility of his work as a zoologist and indeed his open-mindedness (p. 82).
Although the collection explores a wide variety of topics, from demonstration to analogy and metaphor, it is this notion of Aristotle the explorer, the risk-taker in zoological investigation, that guides Lloyd's own explorations. If, as we acknowledged earlier, Lloyd gives due obeisance to the "interdependence of philosophical analysis and . . . empirical investigation" (p. 137), it is Aristotle the practicing zoologist, even the puzzled zoologist, who most interests him.
How, as readers, are we to adjudicate this issue? As I confessed earlier, I do have an answer, though a rather qualiªed one.
On the one side, I hesitate to follow Lennox, for a number of reasons. First, as Lloyd points out, we do not have those ªrst, indemonstrable premises that the Analytics demands. In a way Lennox is showing, in his analysis of the HA, how Aristotle zeroes in on a subject matter that is "commensurately universal": applicable to just this range of phenomena and no more. But we certainly are not given fundamental ªrst principles, both exactly circumscribed and grasped by nous, a faculty superior to the capacity for demonstrative knowledge. Lennox questions whether our knowledge really needs to be like that-though the master certainly said it did. He thinks we will be behaving sufªciently in accord with Aristotle's instructions if we translate his explanations into syllogistic form (although at the close of his ªrst essay he seems to be questioning that, too; see p. 33). If, however, syllogistic form was so important, one wants to ask, why didn't Aristotle use it himself? Why did he write treatises that appear largely inductive or dialectical rather than demonstrative, at least in the sense of being explanatory through the speciªcation of a middle term? Leaving that question aside, however, what I ªnd most worrying is what happens when one does put Aristotle's explanation into his canonical form. Far from exhibiting Aristotle's prowess as a biologist (which I am far from wishing to deny), I ªnd, for example, that the translation into syllogistic form of the account of kidney fat makes it look rather trivial than otherwise. The ne plus ultra of this procedure is to be found in Allan Gotthelf's essay in Aristotelian Biology, "The Elephant's Nose," where, in my view, a long and painstaking analysis of an Aristotelian text reduces it to just the kind of non-explanatory nit-picking that early modern Aristotelians were so often accused of. What has happened to the great naturalist, that indefatigable observer, who watched the male catªsh up in Thrace guarding his young for forty days-a behavior unlikely for an Aristotelian male, and which was not credited until a couple of millennia later, when the critter was christened, in honor of its discoverer, Parasilurus aristotelis? No, I'd much rather start with the zoology, as Lennox himself, in a footnote, suggests one might do (p. 66, n. 3), and see some reºection of Aristotle's biological interests in his philosophy: the metaphysic as well as the philosophy of science.
From that point of view, Lloyd's explorations are refreshing. Here, too, however, I do have some problems. Is Aristotle as thoroughly "open-minded" as Lloyd suggests? Looking at the corpus as a whole, one is impressed by the way he tackles a subject matter, admittedly, with due at-
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Aristotelian Biology tention to difªculties, but in the spirit of one who intends to work his way through it, tidy it all up, and go on to the next job. After all, if you want to produce a good argument, whether logically, dialectically, or rhetorically, you have in each case a book of instructions: the Analytics, the Topics, and the Rhetoric respectively, to show you how. If you want to lead a good life or write a good tragedy, again, you've got a nice neat set of instructions ready to hand. Not, in my view, that this contradicts Aristotle's biological interests. On the contrary, it is just the frame of mind one might expect to ªnd in a devoted practicing naturalist, who wants to see just how this works, to separate this from that, and try to grasp the very nature of just this kind and no other. In 1830, Georges Cuvier was proud to celebrate Aristotle as the founder of comparative anatomy, precisely because he had understood that each organism is made for itself-no sweeping generalizations across everything at once, such as Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire claimed to have found. It is this life-style, this harmonious subordination of characters, for the end of coming to be this kind of animal, that the comparative anatomist is after. And in mapping out a model for the sciences, it seems to me that Aristotle was at least partly moved by that naturalist's propensity to divide and conquer, in Lennox's phrase, to divide and explain. Further, though that is only very peripherally in question in this discussion, it was clearly Aristotle's primary interest in living things that slanted his metaphysics in the direction it took. Whatever one's view of the much analyzed Book Zeta, it is plain that for Aristotle living beings are the most interesting, the most characteristic, instances of substance. So, while acknowledging interaction between the two-practice and theory-let us, on the whole, put practice ªrst. The second major issue we need to raise concerns the relation of Aristotle's science to ours. Insofar as our authors are trying, as best they can, to read Aristotle in his own terms, there is no problem here. It is a question of using the tools of careful linguistic, historical and philosophical scholarship to further our understanding of a thinker speaking to us in a different tongue and from a different culture, though, indeed, one in part continuous with ours. Sometimes, as Lloyd suggests, one would also like "not just to take his work seriously, but to learn from it." That, as he puts it, is an "entirely laudable desire," yet it has its dangers. As Lloyd continues, it "has to be done without assuming that he is one of us (whoever 'we' are) or that his thought is somehow disembodied and timeless" (p. 2). We may take that statement as representing one side of the issue here. Lennox, too, although he does seem to want Aristotle to be not only interesting, but right, wherever possible, also admits that we can learn philosophically as much from understanding our differences from him as we can from understanding the "afªnities" between us (p. xx). So perhaps we can place Lennox, also, if with qualiªcations, on the side of those who recognize the historical distance that separates students of Aristotelian biology from their subject.
Squarely on the other side-and that is what makes this so plainly an issue-we have Wolfgang Kullmann's massive tome, Aristoteles und die moderne Wissenschaft, which seeks to base the whole of modern science, including social science ('Wissenschaft' taken in its broad German sense), on concepts and principles discovered by Aristotle. Where moderns disagree with the master of all who know, they are mistaken; where they are correct, of course they are bound to agree with him. There are students of Aristotle who assimilate him to modern ways of thinking, who write of Aristotelian epistemology or philosophy of language. Even Lloyd, scrupulous historian though he is, errs somewhat, it seems to me, in worrying about Aristotle's "philosophy of mind." Is it or isn't it functionalist? The whole Problemstellung appears to me inappropriate. But what is one to call the contrary of Whiggishness, where, instead of assimilating an earlier thinker to our interests, we try hard to reduce our concerns to his? Whatever we call it, it does exist: Kullmann gives a 450 page example of it.
It is "Aristotle's signiªcance for modern science" ("Aristoteles' Bedeutung für die moderne Wissenschaft") that is his overall theme. Scientiªc knowledge, he believes, moves in the form of a spiral, so that a formerly established paradigm can return, perhaps with more factual backing at its disposal, but still essentially the same as in its ªrst occurrence. This conception of "alternating paradigm change" he contrasts with what he takes (astonishingly) to be Thomas Kuhn's conception of a linear advance from worse to better as paradigms shift. Modern science, though, to be sure, accumulating a lot of additional factual underpinning, has now triumphantly returned to its original, true, solid Aristotelian foundations (p. 29). Let me look at a number of the theses incidental to that overall theme.
To begin with, Kullmann enumerates a number of terms we have retained from Aristotle: category, necessity, induction, etc., etc. "Substance and matter," for example, he concludes, "are physical-chemical basic concepts" (pp. 28-9) . But in what sense is a modern chemical substance an Aristotelian ousia? And Aristotelian matter, which cannot conceivably exist on its own: has it survived the depredations of Descartes and his successors? However, that is only the ªrst of the shocks to which Kullmann subjects his readers. There is much more to come; I can only sample it here.
For one thing, it was Aristotle, it seems, who originated "the conception of bipartite science" ("Die Konzeption der zweigeteilten Wissenschaft"), to which we still subscribe. For it was Aristotle who ªrst distinguished induction and deduction (or demonstration) as the two
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Aristotelian Biology phases of scientiªc research. In Aristotle's ªnite, forever cycling cosmos, however, I should have thought, induction is a nice neat, relevantly ªrst step toward the grasp of the principles of science. For post-Humeans, it is a process that tries to move from potentially inªnite data to necessarily ªnite conclusions, a much chancier undertaking. And in any case, the logical distinction induction/deduction, while it may have been pertinent to philosophy of science in the bad old days of logical empiricism, surely is of little import in more recent, and more historically enlightened, studies of scientiªc practice. Further, in the course of an exposition of Aristotle on tissues and organs, Kullamnn refers to the "mixed bodies" of the Generation and Corruption (II 8, 334 b 31f.) as "chemically joined bodies" ('chemisch verbundene Körper'; p. 180) and proceeds to celebrate Aristotle's grasp of "the idea of chemistry." He writes:
We see how Aristotle, speculatively indeed, yet with the right approach, ªrst grasped the 'idea of chemistry' . . . It is astonishing . . . that he could develop the principle of chemistry, without being able to have access to modern methods of measurement and experiment (p. 181). 2 This is all, one assumes, because Aristotelian "compounds" have properties different from those of their constituents, as water has properties different from those of hydrogen and oxygen. But, please, Aristotle's elements are composed of four qualities, hot, cold, moist and dry, and the conception of a world made primarily of qualities is utterly alien, or so it seems to me, to any modern way of thinking. Nature, Galileo taught us, for good or ill, is written in the mathematical language. A nature in which things are actually the way they are at bottom because they are hotter or colder, moister or drier, is really very hard for us to grasp. If the particles in a substance (our kind of substance!) move faster, it gets hotter-not the other way around. Surely John Dalton was closer to Leucippus or Democritus than to Aristotle! It appears, also, that "Aristotle's pronouncements on natural science already fulªll in many areas essential criteria that we still demand today of natural laws" (p. 244). ( . . . dass Aristoteles' naturwissenschaftliche Aussagen in vielen Bereichen wesentliche Kriterien, die man heutzutage an Naturgesetze stellt, bereits erfüllen.) This takes a bit of stretching, but
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never mind. On the other hand, Aristotelian teleology is of course readily assimilable to the concept of teleonomy introduced by C.S. Pittendrigh and elaborated by Ernst Mayr (pp. 302-306). But we are by no means ªnished. Short of the lengthy treatment of political thought, which would take us too far aªeld (though I may just note that in this case all who consider man a political animal are Aristotelian and good, and all who talk of social contracts are anti-Aristotelian and bad), and of a briefer account of approaches to a theory of communication in the Rhetoric, we have two shockers to come.
First, there is Aristotle's 'epigenetic' embryology, opposed, as usual, to its un-Aristotelian and unenlightened opposite, the idea of preformation, frequently exhibited, according to Kullmann, in numerous ªgures in the history of biology, from Democritus to Darwin and Weismann. He notes that the term "epigenesis" was introduced by Harvey, a good many centuries later, but, he is conªdent, the guiding principle is already there in Aristotle's theory of development. Oddly, he likens Aristotle's account both to Haeckel's biogenetic law, and to the very different concept of von Baer, which he calls the "preliminary form" (Vorform) of that law (p. 286). Kullmann is not the only one to call Aristotle an epigeneticist, but I must confess I ªnd this thesis surprising. After all, if only potentially, but somehow worked up sufªciently to impose itself on the relatively inert female matter, the form of the male parent has got to be there as the agent of development. In fact, if only incidentally, in rejecting preformation in the development of single organs (where we have instead something like a mechanical chain reaction), Kullmann himself refers to the way in which the form of the son is present in the father ("die [Form] des Sohnes im Vater" p. 285). Is that epigenesis? Not to my way of thinking.
The epigenesis-preformation debate, however, belongs primarily to the eighteenth century. Given the advent of modern genetics, one can take development either way: a single cell develops into many differentiated cells, but that single cell contains instructions that govern the development to come. Epigenesis or preformation? Ernst Mayr says it is obvious that once you have a genetic code, you have preformation (personal communication). Kullmann clearly wants it the other way. At the same time-together with his epigenetic story-he wants to ªnd in Aristotle the conceptual foundations of genetics, complete with a genetic code-yes, I really wrote that, and so did he. In the initial summary of his argument he writes:
Aristotle's genetics, seen as an abstract model, has an extraordinary similarity to the modern theory of molecular biology, which has to do with DNA and the genetic code. Thus Aristotle's point of view is not, indeed, superior to modern knowledge, in relation to which it lags far behind in detail, but it is more balanced than the picture of embryology and genetics in the ªrst half of our century. The example shows that the cumulative increase of detailed knowledge does not guarantee the correct total conception, the decision for the right model (pp. 32-33) . 3 He expands on this declaration in due course in a section on "Aristotle's Reºections in the Area of Genetics: The Application of his Craft Model" ("Aristoteles' Überlegungen auf dem Gebiet der Genetik. Die Anwendung seines Technemodells"; pp. 387-300).
Of course Aristotle was handicapped by the fact that the female ovum of mammals was discovered only in the nineteenth century (p. 290). Even here, Kullmann insists, Aristotle modiªed his position sufªciently to give both parents a role (loc.cit.). He proceeds to summarize Aristotle's account of generation, in which the work of the seed introduced into the female matter is likened to that of the carpenter initiating the building of a house. The building itself can go on relatively mechanically, once the male has introduced the impulse to human-hood into the catamenia. Kullmann continues:
This means, therefore, that all the hereditary Anlagen of the male, which move to the female, are transferred in encoded form, that is, in the form of impulses to movement, from the seed to the catamenia present in the female uterus, while the seminal ºuid itself is vaporized. . . . Thus all the hereditary Anlagen (that is, the whole genetic 'program') are at the same time encoded in the whole blood of every human individual (and therewith in his seed) in the form of wave-like movements" (p. 294). 4
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